A Note on Cicero's Understanding of Socrates' Irony [1]

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I Introduction

In much of the last two centuries' scholarly work on Socrates, the Socrates constructed mainly from Plato's *Apology* and his Socratic dialogues [2] is still ironical in praising his interlocutors, especially conceited know-it-alls but no longer so in self-depreciation: by criteria of knowledge, whether they come from his interlocutors' or not, he seriously says he is conscious, though he does not, paradoxically, *know*, that he knows nothing [3]; thus, according to this interpretation, he does not by trading on his mock modesty contrive to refute his interlocutors for refutation's sake but tempts his interlocutors to search for the truth together by answering his questions. Although it is open to question how one can justifiably determine whether *dramatis personae* are sincere or jesting in saying something or to what extent, the most crucial problem for this type of construction is to explain how Socrates, who is conscious he knows nothing, yet can firmly retain beliefs manifested in his word and deed [4]. It had not been properly solved [5] but in the last decades some proposals for solution have been made by distinguishing Socrates' meanings of knowledge and/or by adding to the results of Socrates' refutation some proof for the truth more than his interlocutors' self-contradiction [6].

Likewise, already in the 1st century BCE, Cicero pushed Socrates back into a line with sceptics and distinguished Socrates' confes-

sion of ignorance from Socrates ' irony. Yet his concern is whether Socrates is dogmatic or sceptical, but not how Socrates ' particular questions work. Hence he focuses on Socrates ' affirming nothing but not on asking questions (*interrogare*) even if he always mentions Socrates enquiring about a certain subject-matter (*quaerere*). His Socrates is mostly sceptical but he did not clearly expound how empty of doctrines Socrates remains in his conversation. This is the conclusion I will draw from this survey.

Given that Cicero claims to be a ' New Academician ' or ' a follower of Arcesilaus ' (*Luc*. 2.64-71; *Off*. 2.7), such a sceptical position attributed to Socrates may be a foregone conclusion. Yet what is Cicero's stance and how he can support it are not uncontroversial. Cicero translated partly or perhaps wholly some of Plato's dialogues[7] and knew the reading practice of dividing Socratic from Platonic (or Pythagorean) dialogues according to his pivotal biographical event, his tour to Sicily and Italy[8], yet almost never, as modern philologists do, specified his method or practice in interpreting some particular passage of Plato's dialogues[9]. Hence, one could hardly discuss the interpretive validity of his idea of Socrates ' irony by comparing interpretations line by line of the text concerned; still less, given his choice of the dialogue form in his rhetorical and philosophical writings.

Haury and Takebe enquired of Cicero's concept in his rhetorical and philosophical works and his practice of irony in his speeches but in discussing the concept they mostly left Cicero's dialogue form unanalysed: they did not properly distinguish Cicero the author from his *dramatis personae*[10]. Glucker, however, took the dialogue form seriously. He scrupulously analysed almost the same evidence as I use and thus he discussed the battle for Socrates and Plato fought between two sects of Academicians including Cicero, sceptics and dogmatists[11]. Yet he reserved, and as far as I know, still has reserved, his proper discussion on Socrates ' irony in Cicero's works[12]. Thus, in what follows, I hope to put forward some materials to fill the

gap Glucker has left. Although Cicero does not put forward any adequate line-by-line interpretation of Plato's works to support his remarks on Socrates' irony, I will try to clarify Cicero's position on Socrates' irony from his works, mainly his references to Socrates and their related passages[13].

II Some General Points for Reading *ironia*, εἴρων, *dissimulatio* into the Socrates in Plato's Socratic Dialogues and his *Apology*

The concept and practice of irony is universal in humanity but the origin of εἴρων is obscure[14]. As is seen in the next section the sense of the Greek word (εἴρων; εἰρωνεία) from which words for irony in modern European languages derive is difficult to identify. Moreover, the number of examples in the extant literature contemporary with Socrates is too small to define the sense of the word: εἴρων and its related words are much less frequent than ἀλαζών, κακοῦργος, δεινός or σοφός and as infrequent as γόης or the words, μάσθλης and γλοιός, appearing together with εἴρων in Aristophanes' *Clouds*, 449. Also, Cicero used the Greek εἴρων or εἰρωνεία along with its latinized form *ironia* and his translation *dissimulatio*. Hence, as Haury points out, we should not presuppose that based on the rhetorical works before him Cicero had no other concept of irony than mock modesty and antiphrasis (meaning one of a couple of contrary qualities by a word for its opposite)[15]. Accordingly, what aspect of the Socrates in Plato's Socratic dialogues and his *Apology* could have been related to εἰρωνεία as a kind of feigning, especially, how evasive Socrates could be is to be preliminarily considered.

Irony in a modern sense, saying things different from what one means, has in principle no performative verb such as "I *ironize* that ...". To say, "I talk irony in saying that..." automatically misfires. Irony is, in locution, designed to hide one's intention. A blatant signal spoils it. This is also the case with verbal deceit. The intention of

deceit, if expressed, is botched. Hence, if one intends to talk irony, not deceive others, one must signal something for irony that one's addressee can detect or else that the audience can detect, whether simultaneously or later. Accordingly, intending to speak ironically can be formalized as (1) x is meaning S_2 to y in saying S_1 to y or as (2) x is meaning S_2 to y in saying (and meaning) S_1 to z. But if neither the addressee, y in case (1) nor the audience, y in case (2) can detect what is meant, irony misfires.

Evasiveness in question is, unlike that in statement, not considered to be an aspect of εἰρωνεία but it can be. A false statement, a statement with a false presupposition, or a statement including a fallacious inference can be used to tell a lie but asking about these statements does not mean lying. Asking in itself is not commitment to truth or falsehood. The questioner affirms nothing. Are these things enough evidence that asking questions is acquitted of deceit? Handbooks on criminal investigators' interrogation, judicial examination or sales talk suggest it is not. So does an ancient guidebook on shrewd techniques of questions, Aristotle's *Topica*, Book Eight and *De Sophisticis Elenchis*. Also, frauds in every age adroitly deceive others by questions as well as by appearances, circumstances etc. Therefore, one can try to deceive others by asking questions but *ars latet*.

However, even teachers, instead of seeing if their students can parrot what they teach, can sometimes ask questions cunningly in order to put to the test their students' ability to rightly object to false propositions or fallacies. Teachers can, and do, ask questions cunningly in order to develop their students' irrefutable understanding. If the student gets into perplexity, the teacher may from his ethic explain the solution.

But in other contexts of questioning, one might be able to conceal oneself even more. First, learners do ask unthinkable questions; in that case, *the teacher's* certainty is put to the test. Hence, if one assumes a learner who knows nothing about the subject concerned, one can always, while really asking captiously, apologize for asking stu-

pidly from one's ignorance. Second, serious researchers working together to see if a theory can withstand any possible objections will welcome any conceivable question. Hence, if one assumes a co-investigator, one may continue to question captiously if one's interlocutor enters into apparent collaboration. Accordingly, if one pretends such ignorance, one would be even more evasive.

Therefore, it is hard to catch an ironist shrewd in cunning questions but Plato's Socrates does offer some circumstantial evidence to an interlocutor like Thrasymachus in the *Republic* (*Rp*. 337a3-7[16]), and also to readers who see in Plato's Socratic dialogues a dramaturgy in which a conceited know-it-all is beaten by witty stratagems.

III A Short Review of the Idea of Socrates' Irony before Cicero

Among *loci classici* for εἰρωνεία and its derivative words[17], part of the evidence earliest in the extant literature and contemporary with the historical Socrates, *i.e*., Aristophanes' works and part of Plato's (Plato *Ap*. 38a1; *Gorg*. 489e1; 489e3; *Rp*. 337a4; 337a6), suggests that one could have used εἴρων in a context in which a speaker reprehends his or her opponent for the reason that the opponent denies concealing the true intention or pretends to be sincere or, simply speaking, in a context in which one catches another in an inept evasion. However, less than ten examples could hardly justify taking it as the core sense of εἴρων and it did not bear that sense in Aristotle, Demosthenes, Theophrastus and the other cases of Plato[18].

Yet certainly in the extant literature there are scarcely any case of a word or deed impregnated with no pretence. The words related to εἴρων were mostly used in a pejorative sense. Even Alcibiades' characterization of Socrates with εἰρωνεύεσθαι in Plato's *Symposium* (216e4) implies (1) something opposite to seriousness and (2) Socrates' concealment of the interior, that is, what Alcibiades wants to be revealed. Hence, a clear semantical change is found first in Aris-

totle's *Politics*[19] and *Rhetoric*[20] and Anaximenes of Lampsacus[21]. We have almost no evidence between Anaximenes of Lampsacus and Cicero[22], but Cicero did not, as historians of the meaning of irony have thought[23], completely abandon the negative nuance in the Greek original word; nor did even Quintilian[24], although both of them, of course, owed much to the preceding Greek rhetoric for the construal of εἰρωνεία as part of jest[25].

The possibility of εἰρωνεία in the middle of questioning, not behind or over the whole session of a question-and-answer bout, can be assumed from Plato, *Euthyd*. 302b3 and *Soph*. 268c8 (cf. *Symp*. 218d5; *Amat*. 133d8) but as usual interpretations of these passages show, one could hardly find enough parallels to confirm this assumption[26].

Aristotle is the first, except Socrates' imagined audience in Plato's *Apology* and his interlocutors in Plato's dialogues, to refer to Socrates as εἴρων. Unlike Socrates' interlocutors there Aristotle acquitted Socrates of cheating in examining others' opinion by questioning; his reason is that Socrates takes the role of questioner after his confession of ignorance (*SE* 183b6-8). However, in his discussion about character, Aristotle refers to Socrates' character not as truthful but as false self-depreciation, in opposition to conceit. In this context, Socrates is disposed to conceal his true intention by making himself appear a lesser man than he is (*EN* 1108a19-23; 1127a13-b32). Aristotle does not discuss this seeming incongruity.

According to Cicero, Arcesilaus took Socrates' confession of ignorance seriously (*Ac*. 1.44-45). Against this background, dogmatists before and after Arcesilaus, looking to Socrates for their authority, could not have taken it seriously. Evidence on Socrates' irony before Cicero, except in Cicero's works, is only and tenuously given by Ariston of Keos, Peripatetic in the third century BCE, quoted in Philodemus' περὶ κακιῶν (*On Vices*)[27]. In the beginning of a column of a papyrus, in reference to εἴρων, a subject-matter in the previous column, one may possibly read that Ariston said that Socrates is depreciating himself by extolling others and assuming the air of an idiot,

saying among his other self-depreciations, ἐγὼ γὰρ οἶδα τὶ πλ[ήν γε] τούτου ὅτι οὐδὲν οἶδα; "What do I know except that I know nothing?"[28]

IV Cicero on Socrates 'εἰρωνεία

(1) de Oratore (55 BCE)[29]

(a) Cicero's position

Cicero is not present in the past conversation he creates, according to him, based on Gaius Cotta's report (*de Orat*. 3.16). If the Aristotelian form of dialogue, which we know only on Cicero's authority, is, according to his letter to Atticus (*Att*. 13.19.4 (45 BCE)), a discourse in which the author is a discourse leader, how can the discouse of *de Oratore* be Aristotelian, as he says in his letter to his family (*Fam*. 1.9.23 (54 BCE))? This inconsistency coming from external evidence may be solved by discounting the sense of 'an Aristotelian form' to a way of 'assignment of parts'[30] or an expository discourse in contrast to a Platonic dialectic[31].

On internal evidence, however, Cicero in the frame discourse assumes that Crassus is to him as Socrates is to Plato (3.15-16). Without any explanation Cicero sometimes reads Plato's doctrines into Socrates' speeches in what he regards as the dialogues composed after Plato's tour to Sicily (*e.g., Off.* 1.28; cf. *T.D*. 5.34-37) and sometimes reads the historical Socrates into the Socrates's speeches in Plato's Socratic dialogues (*e.g., Inv.* 53; *Top*. 42; *T.D*. 1.71; cf. *T.D*. 1.97). Hence, it does not necessarily follow that Crassus is his mouthpiece. Yet he would make Crassus say partly, if not wholly, what he could accept.

(b) Caesar's exposition of εἴρων or *dissimulatio*

In Book Two, Caesar, expounding the laughable based on Greek rhetoric books entitled de Ridiculis (*On the Laughable*) (2.217 ff.), refers

to *dissimulatio* (2.269) and εἴρων (2.270). The features of εἴρων in his exposition are: (1) saying things different from what one thinks (alia dicuntur ac sentias); (2) not saying by a single word in a contrary sense (cf. 2.262) but saying in a way different from the way one thinks (aliter sentias ac loquare (2.269)), particularly, jesting austerely or sternly over the whole speech (toto genere orationis severe ludas (2.269; for the word ' severe ', cf. 2.249); (3) witty with seriousness (cum gravitate salsum (2.270; cf. 2.250)). As the example mentioned for the second feature and the example for antiphrasis show, this kind of pretence is an orator's technique of raising laughter among the audience while criticizing the opponent; it is a complex of joking and criticizing, or humour and seriousness. Caesar takes Socrates as its best example, one excellent in speaking indirectly (humour; wit; civilizedness). And, Caesar adds, this pretence suits civilized conversation as well as public statement (2.270-271).

This exposition of εἴρων could be traced along the tradition of rhetoric: clearly feature (1) to Anaximenes of Lampsacus and features (2) and (3) perhaps to Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, 1419b2-9; 1420a1-2[32]. However, Caesar's exclusion of antiphrasis from εἰρωνεία is against the rhetorical tradition. Antiphrasis, especially extolment of one's interlocutor, is clearly performed by Socrates in Plato's Socratic dialogues, so Ariston of Keos thought and perhaps even Aristotle in *Rhetoric* would have thought (1408b19-20). Cicero knows the interpretation that Socrates is ironical in extolling his interlocutor (*Brut*. 292; *Luc*. 2.15). Cicero's own understanding of εἰρωνεία in his letter includes antiphrasis (*Att*. 16.11.2 (44BCE); *Fam.* 4.4.1 (46BCE)) along with mock modesty (*Ad Q*. 3.4.4 (54BCE))[33]. Therefore, Cicero would not entirely have favoured Caesar's exposition at least in the exclusion of antiphrasis from εἰρωνεία, although Cicero might, with Caesar, not have seen εἰρωνεία in any of the particular questions by Socrates.

(c) Crassus's concept of εἰρωνεία

For Crassus Socrates in Plato's dialogues is as adroit in conversa-

tion (*sermo*) as rhetoricians in speeches (3.59-60).

Plato's Socrates would have struck him as so free from any doctrine (3.61; cf. 3.60 quam se cumque in partem dedisset) that Socrates' followers, proclaiming him to be their schools' founder, deduced from Socratic discourses any doctrine they were ready to accept, thus mutually differing, perhaps conflicting, in doctrine (3.61-62;' ...quasi familiae dissentientes inter se et multum disiunctae et dispares, ... 'quote).

In lecturing about sceptics as one of the two sects of Academics, Crassus does not accept but just propounds Arcesilaus' principle (3.67" Arcesilas primum qui Polemonem audierat ex variis Platonis libris sermonibusque Socraticis hoc maxime arripuit, nihil esse certi quod aut sensibus aut animo percipi possit; ...). Crassus then speaks of Carneades as the prominent follower of Arcesilaus but does not propound or justify his position either. Accordingly, Crassus does not, as Cicero does in *Lucullus* (2.74) and *Academica* (1.45), follows Arcesilaus' reading of Plato's Socrates. However, when representing Arcesilaus' actual style of philosophy and attributing its origin to Socrates, Crassus assumes that Socrates' practice is to ' not make clear what he thinks but argue against what any interlocutor of his said he thought (3.67-68" non quid ipse sentiret ostendere sed contra id quod quisque se sentire dixisset disputare "). Crassus here suggests that Socrates, working at refutation, is not asserting what he believes.

If Crassus, good at jesting in oratory, remembered Caesar' previous exposition of εἴρων (2.269; contrast *Luc*. 2.66: ea sentire quae dicerem), he could possibly see something very near to what Caesar regards as Socrates' εἰρωνεία. He does not see εἰρωνεία in the midst of Socrates' questioning. For Crassus, as in the tradition of rhetoric, a non-committal stance inherent to asking a question might not be a matter of εἰρωνεία.

If Cicero too saw irony only in statement or over or behind the whole refutation by Socrates, not in the midst of his questioning, he would not have any chance of finding εἰρωνεία in Socrates' questioning (he might have seen it since he makes an unauthorized addition

to the opening sentence of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* (*Orat*. 114)) but Crassus would. Crassus' Socrates, clearly from Plato's *Gorgias*, revolts against the tradition of his own day in separating philosophy from rhetoric and leads to these two parties' subsequent conflict but Crassus' ideal orator is well acquainted with both sciences and the dialectic of Archesilaus' and Carneades' or of Aristotle's (3.71-72; 3.80; cf. 3.147). His ideal orator including Socrates (1.47; 3.139; cf. 3.129) might well be εἴρων in the midst of question, if so in speech. Yet Crassus in expounding oratorical styles never reaches the idea of εἰρωνεία in dialectic (3.83ff and again 3.148 ff, even in pleasure of metaphor (3.157-170); cf. 3.122 " banter and ridicule of the orator by Socrates in the *Gorgias* "). When referring to *dissimulatio* at last in reference to emotional effect on the audience, *dissimulatio* (alia dicentis ac significantis dissimulatio) is one of the orator's techniques in speeches, not in dialectic, although he suggests the effect of *dissimulatio* is proper not to speech but to conversation (3.203).

Accordingly, under the influence of the traditional understanding of εἰρωνεία Cicero would have seen εἰρωνεία as a figure in statement or address in daily conversation or oration but could not have envisaged it in dialectic.

(2) *Brutus* (46 BCE)

(a) Cicero's understanding of Socrates

Cicero, present in the conversation, and thus, according to his idea of Aristotle's dialogues (see IV (1) (a); cf. *Orat*. 23; *Att*. 13.19.4), leading the discussion, adduces the Greek tradition of eloquence in defense of the thesis that eloquence is the most difficult thing (*Brut*. 25ff.). Here, to eristic sophists he opposes Socrates, who, he says (30-31), used to refute their doctrines by means of some certain ' precision of argument ' in ' dialectic [34] (qui subtilitate quadam disputandi refelle eorum instituta solebat verbis). Whether Cicero attributes the act of refutation (refelle) to Socrates' intention or to a repeated result from the conversational interaction Socrates participates in *or both* may be

crucial for Cicero's leniency to Socrates' moves in dialectic. If Socrates is intentional in refuting others, it is open to question how Cicero justifies Socrates; and if Socrates uses precise logic, whether unconditionally or only when against a conceited know-it-all and/or eristic. Yet, to say the least, Cicero's Socrates, clearly from Plato's, is up to something in his question. Like Socrates' confession of ignorance, which some readers had already interpreted as εἰρωνεία this 'precision' is a step toward, or a means of, refutation but Cicero does not see εἰρωνεία here either.

(b) Atticus' understanding of Socrates' *ironia*

At the closing part of Cicero's exposition of the Attic style of speech, Atticus breaks in and tries to push Cicero to admit Cicero's estimation of Roman orators to have been *ironia*, if not a false representation (291-300).

Thus Atticus analyses and with qualification evaluates Socrates' *ironia* as people then found it in Socrates (292). For Atticus, it is that which Socrates trades on in Plato's, Xenophon's and Aeschines of Sphettos' works; and it is for anyone, when wisdom is at issue, to 'deny it to himself and to attribute it playfully' to those who claim to possess it (Hendrickson, Loeb). In Plato's dialogues, he describes, it is to extol sophists and to assume ignorance of everything. Atticus may associate "elegans", as Glucker suggests[35], with χαριείς in Aristotle *EN* 1127b23 and b31, but if Atticus here sees Socrates' counterblow against sophists more than his mock modesty before ἀλαζών (a braggart), he will imply by "faceta (clever)", "elegans (skillful)" and "minime inepti (of no foolish man)" that Socrates is not morally laudable but shrewd in speech, especially in refutation of conceited know-it-alls. In fact, he does not unconditionally justify *ironia* but suggests that *ironia* is to be so much reprehended in the historical exposition Cicero has just made on Roman orators as the *ironia* assumed in the situation where one must testify in court[36].

Atticus admits use of *ironia*, a complex of the feigned ignorance

and extolment, insofar as it is made against sophists but criticizes it if one is expected to speak sincerely, as in historical discourse and testimony. It is not clear whether Atticus justifies Socrates in doing more against a conceited know-it-all than feigning ignorance and extolment but he suggests that Socrates' conversation with sophists, whether before or in the middle of refutation, is a situation in which not speaking sincerely to the addressee is not reprehensible and perhaps in which refutation by precise logic is permissible. Atticus here is silent about Socrates' dialectic.

(c) Cicero's Understanding of εἴρων in Reply to Atticus

In reply to Atticus, Cicero, replacing the latinized form in Atticus' speech with the Greek form εἴρων (298; 299), denies that as Atticus says, he is εἴρων in estimating Roman orators. Thus he means by εἴρων one who feigns ignorance and extolment. Also, unlike Atticus (299), Cicero avoids mentioning Socrates as an example of εἴρων and is reluctant to call P. Cornelius Aemilianus Africanus Scipio εἴρων (299). His Socrates cannot be εἴρων if the term is used pejoratively. At least, he could not unconditionally justify Socrates in feigning ignorance and extolment even in the presence of a conceited know-it-all.

(3) *de Finibus* (45BCE)

(a) Cicero's understanding of Socrates

Cicero appears in the conversation he creates and expounds what Socrates' method is in Plato's dialogues (2.1-2). In contrast to Gorgias, who invites his interlocutors to ask him what they want to hear expounded, Cicero says, Socrates argues with others and elicits their opinions by questionings (*interrogare; percontari*). Cicero's Socrates here is certainly a questioner but he may not, as Cicero's Socrates usually does elsewhere (see below), conceal his opinion. Cicero suggests, whether or not so he interprets in Plato's Socratic dialogues, that Socrates at questioning intends to reveal his opinion, if any, by

commenting on his respondents ' answer to his questions. Even in referring to Arcesilaus as a successor of Socrates, Cicero does not, as he usually does, mention Arcesilaus ' concealing his opinion or affirming nothing. Nor does he mention Socrates ' or clearly Arcesilaus ' refutation. Cicero s̓ point is certainly the contrast of Gorgias ' showoff speech with Socrates ' argument *ad hominem* but his remark on Socrates ' purpose in the argument challenges Socrates ' seriousness in confession of ignorance.

(4) *Lucullus* (45 BCE)

(a) Lucullus s̓ view of Socrates ' εἰρωνεία, *dissimulatio*

In his observation of the sceptical tradition, Lucullus, an advocate for Antiochus, tries to rescue Plato and Socrates from what Arcesilaus framed as the tradition, Lucullus says, with an intention of overthrowing the then established philosophy (qui constitutam philosophiam everteret (*Luc*. 2.15)); for Lucullus, Arcesilaus took refuge in the authorities who had denied the possibility of knowing or grasping anything (in eorum auctoritate delitisceret qui negavissent quidquam sciri aut percipi posse (ibid.)).

Thus, whereas appraising Plato as one of the highest systems of doctrine (ibid.), Lucullus sees in Socrates *dissimulatio* as εἰρωνεία in Greek (ibid.).

Lucullus accepts the definition of εἰρωνεία in the rhetorical tradition: saying something different from what one thinks (*de Orat*. 2.269; 3.203; Anaximenes of Lampsacus), and also, in agreement with Caesar in *de Oratore* (2.269-270) and Atticus in the *Brutus* (292), he adduces with Socrates Cornelius Aemilianus Africanus Scipio as an example on the authority of Fannius. Yet Lucullus, unlike Caesar, does not exclude antiphrasis from εἰρωνεία.

εἰρωνεία in Lucullus ' Socrates is both to disparage oneself and to attribute more to those whom one wishes to refute. Lucullus ' description is verbatim similar to Atticus ' in the *Brutus* (292) but they differ in two things: first, although both interpretations mainly come from

Socrates ' confession of ignorance in Plato s Socratic dialogues, Lucullus means self-disparagement by ' detrahere ' (*OLD*) whereas Atticus disavowal of wisdom; second, Lucullus regards Socrates ' εἰρωνεία as a stratagem for refutation whereas Atticus does not mention this relation. Furthermore, unlike Cicero s reference to Socrates ' refutation in the *Brutus* (see above IV (2) (a)), Lucullus attributes refutation to Socrates ' intention. Hence, Lucullus ' Socrates deliberately disparages himself to refute others. Neither refutation in itself nor pretending for refutation is unconditionally justifiable. Hence, if Lucullus did not morally reprehend Socrates ' εἰρωνεία, he might assume with Fannius that Socrates is morally good, or otherwise that Socrates ' εἰρωνεία is not morally indifferent. However, he does not make clear his position. Nevertheless, if unlike Atticus in the *Brutus* or Fannius, Lucullus is to lead Socrates back into his anti-sceptical tradition, Socrates must be *un*sceptical either inside or outside his refutation except in this pretence.

(b) Cicero s position

In the introduction of his reply to Lucullus, Cicero declares himself a sceptic following Arcesilaus (*Luc*. 2.64-71, esp. 68-69; cf. *N.D*. 1.11; *T.D*. 4.47). His shared principle is that nothing can be grasped but he is arguing not for argument s sake or to deceive others or even himself but to find the truth (*Luc*. 2.65-66; cf. 2.60) and avoid self-deception (*error*). His sceptical stance, affirming nothing lest one should consent to uncertain things, is a kind of moral principle which he believes comes from Arcesilaus (*Luc*. 2.65-67) and thus probably from Socrates (cf. Plato s *Apology*[37] and *Gorgias*[38]).

(c) Cicero s reply to Lucullus ' view of Socrates

Against Lucullus ' removal of Plato and Socrates from scepticism, Cicero shoves them back in line. Although he may find evidence mainly from Plato s dialogues, he fully asserts from many dialogues (2.74) that Socrates holds that nothing can be known (Socrati ni-

hil sit visum sciri posse) and that he excludes from what cannot be known only one thing and no more, that is, that he knows that he knows nothing (excepit unum tantum, scire se nihil se scire, nihil amplius (2.74)). Hence, whether Cicero commits himself to scepticism in the paradoxical form or not, his Socrates holds that he knows he knows nothing.

Then, Cicero's Plato follows his Socrates. Cicero says that if Plato had not assented to Socrates' position, he would not have persisted in showing (perescutus non esset) it in so many dialogues. The implication of the verb 'persequor' in 'haec persecutus' here and 'ironiam persequi' in the next sentence is open to question. Rackham (Loeb) translates both by 'set out'[39]; Haury translates 'persecutus' by 'exposer' and 'persequi' by 'exploiter'[40]; Dörrie, 'persecutus' by '[diesem Thema] nachgehen' and 'persequi' by 'weiterverfolgen'[41]; Schäublin, both by 'folgen'[42]; Broemser, Stein, and Gigon, 'haec persecutus esset' by 'dieser Überzeugung Ausdruck verleihen' and 'ironeam persequi' by 'sie [= die Ironie] festhalten'[43]; Sedley, both by 'persist with'[44]. The verb here, at least in the first appearance, must imply not merely verbal assent but also some action. Since 'probavisset' in the protasis and 'persecutus' in the apodosis share in the object 'haec' implying Socrates' position as a whole or confession of ignorance, the whole conditional sentence could not mean a tautology. Certainly, approval and conformity is closely related but *probare*, to approve or assent, does not necessarily imply action (see *Ac*. 1.7). So if 'persequor' is interpreted to be an action such as 'follow up' or 'run through' (*OLD*), the whole sentence will make sense.

However, more difficult is the interpretation of the next sentence with 'persequi' (ironiam enim alterius, perpetuam praesertim, nulla fuit ratio persequi (*Luc*. 2.74-75). The possible interpretations are as follows. (1) No one can seriously believe that he can know nothing with only one exception: he knows he knows nothing; hence, it is a kind of irony. However, Socrates still seriously disavows knowledge other-

wise. (2) Socrates ' disavowal of knowledge is nothing other than the belief in (1). It is paradoxical but not an irony. (3) Socrates ' disavowal of knowledge in (2) is an irony. I reject (1) because Cicero does not refer to any other form of Socrates ' disavowal of knowledge anywhere. The text here seems to support (3) but it does not conform to Cicero's intention of bringing Socrates back into the sceptical tradition. Accordingly, I explore the possibility of (2) for the following reasons. First, like the supposed collocation in the first sentence ' Socratis confessionem ignorationis persequi ', the collocation ' ironiam Socratis persequi 'is rather harsh if the verb is ' follow 'or ' conform to '. As in the first sentence, it would be better to read into its sense some action such as exposition or exhibition (cf. *Luc*. 2.1; *Ac*. 1.12). Second, Socrates ' *ironia*, especially as unremitting *ironia*, ' ironiam alterius, perpetuam praesertim ' with the verb ' persequi ' appears to correspond in description of frequency with Socrates ' confession of ignorance that Cicero claims is written in many dialogues. Hence, the *ironia* seems to refer to Socrates ' factual activity but if so, what sense of *persequi* could go with Cicero's presupposition that Socrates is εἴρων? Hence, pace Haury, as the translation by Broemser, Stein, and Gigon shows[45], this *ironia* is referred to as counterfactual, which also allows of the previous sense of" persequor ". Third, as to the relation coordinated with *enim*, it would be slightly odd if by saying that there had no reason for Plato to exhibit Socrates ' *ironia* Cicero would explain the counterfactual statement or its implication that because Plato assented to Socrates ' position, Plato exhibited it or even if Cicero would argue for the presence of a motivation (' probare ') from the reasonable lack of another motivation (' ironiam persequi '). Hence ' enim ' here will work as epexegetical rather than as causal.

Despite Cicero's confidence of evidence on the paradoxical form of Socrates ' disavowal of knowledge, one cannot find any exact Greek original, even in Plato's *Apology*; nor can one trace along any particular passage Cicero's interpretive procedure. Cicero might describe Socrates ' state of mind rather than Socrates ' statement in a

particular passage but Cicero is hard to communicate with on the text he regards as the original[46].

Even if Plato makes Socrates disavow wisdom in many works, it does not follow that Plato sees scepticism in Socrates' disavowal of wisdom and supports it or that he means the disavowal to be taken seriously. Nevertheless, it is unclear even in *Academica* whether Cicero reads Plato's doctrine in his dialogues. In fact, he mentions one, probably from the *Timaeus*, in propounding the history of dogmatism (*Luc*. 2.118).

(5) *Academica* I

(a) Varro's understanding of Socrates

Varro, though an advocate for Antiochus' dogmatism, propounds, along the tradition not clearly of dogmatism but rather of scepticism (cf. *Ac*. 1.44; *Luc*. 2.74; contrast *T.D*. 5.10-11), Socrates' historical role of leading philosophy from cosmological to moral subject-matters (*Ac*. 1.15). Thus he discusses Socrates' way of refutation in the conversation. Socrates, he lectures also in sceptics' terms (*Ac*. 1.44-45), affirms nothing himself, refutes others (refellat alios) and says that he knows nothing except that he knows nothing (*Ac*. 1.16). According to Varro, these features are found in Socratic dialogues by many writers other than Plato but the next general features he mentions come clearly from Plato's *Apology*: Socrates says that he is superior to others because while they think they know what they do not know he knows only one thing, that is, that he knows nothing; then he says that he believes that for that reason he is said by Apollo to be the wisest of all because all and the only wisdom is that one does not think one knows what one does not know. This sceptical stance is constantly Socrates', Varro continues. Varro is here putting forward a 'syncretic' but clearly Platonic, Socrates. Furthermore, his Socrates is not a mere sceptic but a positivist who exhorts others to virtue. However, his Socrates does no more. Thus, Varro's Socrates has no doctrine to teach but his Plato is a dogmatist. For from Plato on, he

lectures, Socratic schools abandoned Socrates' sceptic stance for positive doctrines (1.17-18).

(b) Cicero's understanding of Socrates

Cicero mentions Socrates twice in his exposition of scepticism in reply to Varro (*Ac*. 1.43 ff.). Cicero's Socrates confesses ignorance (confessio ignorationis) (1.44) because his Socrates shares with his predecessors and Arcesilaus the idea that although the truth exists it shows itself obscure. However, Cicero's Socrates only denies that anything can be known whereas Arcesilaus further denies this denial that one can know that one know nothing (1.45).

This means that Cicero interprets Socrates' confession of ignorance as serious and, whether based on Socrates' disavowal of wisdom in cosmology in Plaoto's *Apology*[47] or not, perhaps, as a signal for his belief in the obscurity of the truth.

However, a question arises from his remark on Plato's works (1.46). Does Cicero attribute to Socrates a way of arguing for and against a proposition and in what sense? As Lucullus' argument against sceptics suggests (*Luc*. 2.60) and as Cicero's description of Arcesilaus' method shows (*Ac*. 1.45), Cicero thinks Arcesilaus was always doing that. But is it also Socrates' practice? According to Crassus' description at *de Oratore* 3.67-68, as I mentioned above, if "Socraticum" here means "Socrates', "not "Socratic," Arcesilaus shares with Socrates the way of arguing against the opponent's opinion without making clear one's opinion. But Crassus does not imply that Socrates also argues for the opponent's opinion. Crassus here does not disaccord with Cicero's description in *N.D*. 1.11 (see below). Nevertheless, another description of Crassus' at de Oratore 3.71-72 and 80 is controversial. It suggests that whereas arguing against both affirmation and denial of a proposition probably made by the opponent (contra omne quod propositum sit disserat) is Arcesilaus' and Carneades' style of discourse, arguing for and against a proposition (de omnibus rebus in utramque sententiam possit dicere et in omni causa

duas contrarias orationes praeceptis illius cognitis explicare (*de. Orat.* 3.80)) is Aristotle's. Although both styles may be Socratic and although Crassus 'Socrates is an ideal orator expert in dialectic, Crassus does not imply that either style is Socrates'. Glucker does not seem to envisage this point[48]. Although it is not clear whether Cicero is committed to Crassus 'position, Cicero at *Ac*. 1.46 explains features of Plato's works in order to keep Plato in line with Arcesilaus, by saying, "nihil adfirmatur et in utramque partem multa disseruntur, de omnibus quaeritur, nihil certi dicitur." Since Socrates is mainly a discussion leader in Plato's works, does Cicero by this description imply that Socrates affirms nothing, argues for and against many propositions, enquires on all the points raised, and says nothing certain? The last two pieces in Cicero's description suggests the contrast between the consistent enquiry and the lack of positive answers but if by the verb *quaero* Cicero meant Socrates 'questioning, how could his Socrates argues for any proposition by asking questions? If these features do partly not accord with Plato's Socrates in his Socratic dialogues, does Cicero mean that Plato commits himself to doing what Cicero describes here? Cicero certainly intends to distinguish Plato as a sceptic from dogmatists but he does not put forward any textual evidence or interpretive method.

(6) *de Natura Deorum* (45 BCE)

(a) Cicero's understanding of Socrates 'dialectic behind Arcesilaus 'scepticism

In the preface to Book One, Cicero takes Arcesilaus 'and Carneades 'scepticism for an example of the succession of philosophical doctrines. He finds their origin in Socrates and describes his method succeeded by them as "the philosophical method of arguing against anything and of definitely making a decision on nothing (*N.D.* 1.11)." This does not entirely accord with Plato's Socrates at least in his *Apology* and *Gorgias* even among Plato's Socratic dialogues. Plato's Socrates sometimes openly avows and implies a certain knowledge

and sometimes holds a firm belief[49]. And as Glucker suggests[50], definitely making a decision on nothing does not exclude indefinitely making a decision if it is still making a decision. Even Cicero's Socrates, therefore, allows of a little suspicion about his seriousness in confession of ignorance.

(7) *Tusculanae Disputationes* (44 BCE)

(a) Cicero's understanding of Socrates' discourse

Along with many other references to Socrates' doctrines, from Plato (1.71-72 (cf. 1.97), 1.103,) or other Socratics (4.80; 5.26; 5.47, 5.91 cf. 3.31; 3.77; 5.97; 5.108), and Plato's doctrines from his dialogues (1.20, 1.49, 1.53 (the *Phaedrus*), 1.57 (the *Meno*), 1.58 (the theory of forms), 1.63 (the *Timaeus*), 1.70, 2.27 (the *Republic*), 4.10, 5.34-36 (the *Gorgias*) et passim) or letters (5.100) or from some biographical sources (1.39), which clearly contradict Socrates' seriousness in his confession of ignorance, Cicero, in the introduction, characterises Socrates' discourse not as entirely negative but as a way in which something similar to the truth is found, although from his interlocutors' belief (1.8). Later in Book Two, however, he describes his way of discourse as originated not from Socrates but from Aristotle (consuetudo de omnibus rebus in contrarias partes disserendi (2.8-9)). In Book Five, propounding Socrates' historical role in philosophy, Cicero describes Socrates' discourse as that in which while concealing one's own opinion, one is trying both to relieve others of deception and to look for something similar to the truth (5.11).

Cicero's Socrates is sometimes described as one who conceals his opinion, elicits his interlocutor's commitments and refutes their initial position as in *N.D.* 1.11; Inv. 1.51-54 and sometimes as one who attains a proof or something similar to the truth as here and in *Top.* 42. Cicero repeatedly mentions Socrates as an enquirer (*quaerere*)[51], but he seldom focuses on Socrates' questioning (*interrogare*) in his general description (*Fin.* 2.2; cf. *T.D.* 1.57). He does not explain, on textual evidence in Plato's works, how, unlike an orator or Aristotle in his

lost dialogues, Plato's Socrates can prove the truth or something near it by just asking questions.

(8) *de Officiis* (44 BCE)

(a) Cicero's position

Cicero, admitting himself to be a follower of Socrates and Plato (1.2) and a sceptic of the "New Academy" (2.7; 3.20), assumes as a principle common to his school, sceptical Academicians, that nothing can be grasped (percipi nihil posse (2.7)) and as a style of philosophising that his school argue against everything (contra omnia disputatur (2.8)). In reply to an imaginary criticism against his consistency between propounding his opinion and disavowing the grasping of anything (2.7), he also assumes that things probable (probabilia) can be accepted (cf. 3.20). Indeed, Socrates in this book believes in something firmly (1.148; 2.43; 3.11). This is, as I mentioned above, partly the case with Plato's Socrates. Yet again unlike Plato's Socrates Cicero both disavows the grasping of anything and as in Cicero's Aristotle, thinks it a rule of argument to approach an issue from both sides.

(b) Cicero's understanding of Socrates 'εἴρων

In propounding the cultivation of jesting (1.103-104), Cicero sees refined (elegans), polite (urbanum), clever (ingeniosum), and witty (facetum) jesting in Socrates in the books of Socratic philosophy in contrast with coarse (illiberans), rude (petulans), vicious (flagitiosum) and indecent (obscenum) jesting in comedies. Considering both his idea of human nature in this section and his allegiance to Plato and Socrates (cf. 1.2), Cicero would likely project his ideal characteristic on Socrates. If so, his Socrates would be primarily serious (severitas) and, even when jesting, be suggesting something serious, which implies that his addressee may not understand what he meant, while he expects his other audience to understand his true intention. This characterization is similar to Caesar's in *de Oratore* (2.269; "severe ludas" but I interpreted it not "seriously play" but "severely play"; see above.).

In enumerating the individual nature of historical persons (1.107), Cicero describes Socrates as εἴρων, who is charming and witty and amusing of speech and a pretender in everything he says (dulcem et facetum festivique sermonis atque in omni oratione simulatorem) in contrast to Pythagoras and Pericles who reach the highest authority without any cheerfulness. As εἴρων, Socrates, cheerful, witty, and unauthoritative, is concealing his opinion in conversation and statement but it is not clear whether Cicero implies that Socrates' disavowal of wisdom is ironical.

As to characterization of Hannibal and Quintus Maximus in the same section (1.108), concealing one's intention (dissimulare) is included in warfare strategy such as easily concealing oneself (facile celare), being silent (tacere), lying in ambush (insidiari), 'forestalling the enemy's designs'[52] (praeripere hostium consilia). As he mentions at the end of personal characterization (1.109), Cicero sees countless dissimilarities in personalities. Furthermore, he entirely disapproves dissimulation in Roman civil life (3.61). Accordingly, although Cicero claims to know Aristotle's *Topica* in his *Topica*, it will be hard for him to see in Socrates' conversation such strategies applicable, as Aristotle suggests in his *Topica*, Book Eight and *Sophistici Elenchi*, to dialectic.

V Conclusion: Cicero's Understanding of Socrates' εἰρωνεία

The Socrates on whom Cicero superimposes his ideal would make it a principle (i) that finding the truth is morally agreeable ((4) (b)[53] *Luc*.) and (ii) that *error*, self-deception, not ignorance, is morally reprehensible ((4) (b) *Luc*. ; (7) (a) *T.D*. ; cf. N.D. 1.1).

Cicero's Socrates believes (iii) that nothing can be grasped ((8) (a) *Off*.) and therefore (iv) that nothing can be known ((4) (c) *Luc*.; (5) (b) *Ac*. I). Therefore, (v) he affirms nothing ((6) (a) *N.D*.).

As the only exception to (iv), (v) Cicero's Socrates believes he

knows that he know nothing ((4) (c) *Luc*.). Therefore, (vi) he is serious in confessing his ignorance ((5) (b) *Ac*. I; (6) (a) *N.D*.).

In his conversation, (vii) Cicero's Socrates conceals his opinion ((1) (c) *de Orat*.; (6) (a) *N.D*.), (viii) argues against and only from his interlocutor's opinion ((1) (c) *de Orat*.; cf. *Inv.* 52-54), (ix) either intentionally or as an unintended result, refutes his interlocutor ((2) (a) *Brut*.), and (x) if intentionally, either all the time during his conversation or sometime after his interlocutor's particular commitment, uses dialectical techniques as a means of refutation ((2) (a) *Brut*.). However, (xi) his process of refutation is precise and fair ((2) (a) *Brut*.; (4) (b) *Luc*.). Therefore, (xii) εἰρωνεία, mainly as feigned extolment, which is undesirable in daily life but desirable only when made against one's opponent in the presence of the audience, is performed outside refutation ((1) (c) *de Orat*.; (2) (c) *Brut*.; (8) (b) *Off*.).

And (xiii) Cicero's Socrates in the midst of conversation leaves room for finding something near the truth ((6) (a) *N.D*.; (7) (a) *T.D*.; cf. (3)(a) *Fin*.)

As a fundamental fact on which his understanding of Socrates rests, Cicero must, and does, see in Socrates an enquirer, one who raises questions on a certain subject-matter (*quaerere*) (see n. 51). Certainly, Cicero's Socrates affirms nothing because his Socrates believes he knows he knows nothing. But does Cicero focus on asking questions, not affirming nothing? He mentions Arcesilaus' or Carneades' arguments but does not specifically describe their question-and-answer bouts[54]. He mentions Socrates' conversation, argument, and discussion and even his enquiry in general and, not never, Socrates' questioning (*interrogare*), but does not explore Socrates' particular questions. His Socrates, empty of knowledge, must be serious in confessing ignorance and fair in the middle of refutation. Like Arcesilaus his Socrates may be arguing against anything and in order to do this his Socrates should have been asking questions. Yet his Socrates also works at something near the truth in the midst of the conversation, which Cicero also should have taken as

refutation of any statement. Why Cicero then could think such subtlety possible remains unsolved or difficult to trace to the textual evidence in Plato's works. The reason is partly, I conjecture, (1) that although Carneades, who is in Cicero's works one of the ideal orators, eloquent and philosophical[55], paired not only with Arcesilaus[56] but also with Aristotle[57], advanced the theory of probability or something near the truth in discussion on the certainty of sense-perception, not directly from Plato's Socrates at moral issues[58], Cicero superimposes a theorist of this milder scepticism over his Socrates at 5.11 *Tusculanae Disputationes* and therefore (2) that Cicero would not clearly have distinguished between (i) arguing both for and against a statement and (ii) refuting, not intentionally all the time but as an unintended result, the opponent's statement by asking questions. Cicero would hardly have distinguished between Aristotle's way of arguing for and against a statement and Arcesilaus' way of arguing against both the denial and affirmation of the opponent's statement (*Ac*. 1.45), but certainly between either of the two and one of Socrates' ways: intentionally arguing against the opponent's statement. However, if Socrates were seeking for the truth in Cicero's sense of"sceptic", Socrates could not entirely wish for refutation in itself but for the truth (*N.D*. 1.4). Then, for Cicero Socrates' refutation would not be far from arguing both for and against a statement at least in process (*T.D*. 1.17-23, 2.5-6; cf. 5.11; *Off*. 2.8).

VI Appendix

Vlastos, among those modern readers who have worked at this Ciceronean subtlety communicably on Plato's text, takes seriously Socrates' confession of ignorance, which he calls 'disavowal of knowledge' because of the interchangeability between knowledge and wisdom. The reason is not the same as Cicero's (iii)-(vi) but Socrates' seriousness in narrating in his defense his past psychology

in Plato's *Apology*. He properly discusses Socrates' question. In the midst of refutation, he argues, Socrates demonstrates his own belief by his interlocutor's self-contradiction. Hence, with Cicero, but for a different reason, he clears Socrates' refutation by questioning of cheating moves and simply contrasts seriousness inside the questionings to irony outside.

Whether or not Vlastos' simple contrast accords with Plato's text in the details and whether or not the fairness in Socrates' refutation can be secured in Socrates' intention independently of the dramatic effect of his interlocutors' silence or critical attitude toward Plato's Socrates, I leave open here. However, his discussion on Socrates' irony has another important implication for reading Plato's dialogues. Socrates' irony or ε᾽ιρωνεία, perhaps together with his seriousness to his intended audience, is certainly practiced under the convention shared with his interlocutor and the audience inside the conversations described in the Socratic literature. However, if it is also to be detected by readers outside, this prompt to readers' detection can be included in the author's literary responsibility[59]. If this assumption is right, Plato's dialogues can be not a body of completely independent works in which the author's intention is concealed but partly or wholly what Plato intended readers to practice exploring by reading back, reading twice or reading his other works. It does not immediately follow that constructing Plato's position by reading more than a single dialogue on some assumption of Plato's development or even allegorically reading some systematic thoughts into Plato's dialogues is a legitimate approach to Plato. Plato's writing of Socrates' irony, however, suggests that instead of conclusively propounding his position Plato did partly commit readers not merely to understanding his texts, as modern philologists usually do on ancient texts, but even to exploring and appraising what he represented in his dialogues. Perhaps, just as we sometimes cannot instantly grasp someone's real intention although we sense his or her irony, so Socrates' irony can be Plato's temptation to scrutiny[60].

Plato might give us some clues, seemingly in tandem with Socrates but did he really ensure that he was always concealing his answer somewhere in the dialogue?

Part of this paper arises from an example of research and report I advanced in my class on study skills for the first year students of the University of Seijo in 2003. I am grateful to Harold Tarrant for suggesting some recent works on the subject I discuss here, especially, John Glucker's, and most to Michael Stokes for reading the penultimate draft and for his helpful questions and comments. The remaining faults and errors here are mine, though.

Note

1) I refer to Cicero's and other Latin authors' works by abbreviation listed in *OLD* and to classical Greek works by that in LSJ. But reference to the first edition of *Academica* is made by *Lucullus* (*Luc*. for short).

2) A group of dialogues in which Socrates elicits his interlocutors' belief by asking questions and leads them to self-contradiction in their commitments to both the proposition embodied in his question and common sense.

3) Socrates in Plato's *Apology* actually does not say that he knows nothing but he says that he is not conscious he is wise in anything great or small (21b) or that he knows that he is worth nothing in respect of wisdom (23b). For the discussion and solution of the problem that the paradoxical form of Socrates' confession of ignorance arises from the deduction by assuming the interchangeability of σοφός, σοφία, ἐπίσταμαι (ἐπιστήμη), ἐμαυτῷ σύνοιδα and ἔγνωκα, see Stokes, 1997, esp. 17-21; Notomi, 2003. The passage in question is: *Ap*. 21b4-5; 21c-e; 22c9-d1; 23a7-b3 (Nicolls text, 1995). The translations are, for example: 21b4-5: Schleiermacher: "Denn das bin ich mir doch bewusst, dass ich weder viel noch wenig weise bin"; Jowett: "for I know that I have no wisdom, small or great"; Croiset (Budé): "j'ai conscience, moi, que je ne suis savant ni peu ni buaeucoup"; Reale: "Infatti, io ho chiara coscienza, per quanto mi riguarda, di non essere sapiente, né molto né poco"; 22c9-d1: Schleiermacher: "Denn von mir selbst wusste ich, dass ich gar nichts weiss..."; Jowett: "for I was conscious that I know nothing at all"; Croiset: "Car j'avais conscience que je ne savais à peu près rien"; Reale: "Infatti, ero perfettamente consapevole di non sapere nulla della loro arte"; " 23a7-b3: Schleiermacher: "..., der wie Sokrates einsieht, dass er in der That nichts werth ist was die Weisheit anbelangt"; Jowett: "...,

who, like Socrates, knows that his wisdom is in truth worth nothing"; Croiset: " ..., qui sait, comme Socrate, qu'en fin de compte son avoir est nul"; Reale: " ..., chi come Socrate, si è reso conto che, per quanto riguarda la sua sapienza, non valle nulla. "The deduction of the paradox arises in Jowett's introduction (93) and Reale's (24).

4) *E.g., Ap*. 25d9-26a8; 28b3 ff., esp. 29b6-7; 30d1-2; 31d6-e2; for the complete list of Socrates claims to knowledge in the Apology, see Reeve, 1989, 53-61.

5) For the interpretation on the historical Socrates which leaves the problem of the irreconcilability of Socrates' serious confession of ignorance or sincere humility with his doctrine, exhortation to virtue, or vaunting attitude, see Tennemann, 1829, 109-110; Erdmann, 1922 (orig. 1878), I 80-86; Pfleiderer, 1896, 53-69; Ræder, 1905, 88-92; for the Socrates who by the knowledge of the criterion of knowledge knows that he knows nothing, see Schleiermacher, 1818 and 1809-1823; for the Socrates who, while by his criterion of knowledge seriously confessing ignorance and thus, as a questioner (maieutic), helping others in learning, reserves his positive doctrine or exhortation to virtue, as in Xenophon's *Memorabilia* 4.2, outside his questioning, see Hegel, 1817; Hermann, 1839, 242 ff.; Zeller, 1875, 101-112; Riddell, 1877, xxxii-xxxiv; Praechter, 1920, 154; Guthrie, 1971, esp. 122-129 (a paradoxical form of scepticism " knowing one knows nothing, "though, still appears, once each in Hegel and Riddell); for the Socrates in Plato's *Apology* who, from serious confession of ignorance, does nothing but refute others as his own mission, see Grote, 1865, I 288-296; Wohlrab, 1877, 19-21; Schanz, 1893, 92-99; 104-110 (the Delphic oracle is a literary device by which for Socrates to propose his mission); Hackforth, 1933, 88-104; 135-173 (who yet sees irony, or rational scepticism against free-thinkers, in Socrates' attitude toward the Delphic Oracle); cf. Reid, 1885, 264; Vlastos, 1957; Kidd, 1967, 480-5; Slings, 1994, 58-82; for Plato's Socrates who, conscious of want of certainty, continuously seeks for certain knowledge in refuting others, see Ritter, 1910-1923, I 71-77.

For the Socrates who ironically confesses his ignorance, see Ast, 1816, 477 ff. (who thus athetizes the *Apology*); Socher, 1820, 69-78; Dyer, 1885, 17-19 ; Gomperz, 1912, 38-40; 81-87; Maier, 1913, 367 ff.; Windelband, 1919 (orig. 1892), 76-81; 94-98; Burnet, 1908-1926, 664-672; 1914, 106-107; Taylor, A.E. 1929. 915-920, esp. 917 (contrast *id*., 1956, 46-48); Jaeger, 1943, II 13-76; esp. 59-60; 62 ff.; for Socrates' irony in the paradoxical form of confession of ignorance that he knows he knows nothing, see Bury, 1902, II 140-147; Friedländer, 1928, 160-179; 1958, 137-153; 1964, 148.

6） Irwin, 1977, 39-40; Vlastos, 1983, 27-58; 1985, 1-31; 1991, 21-44; 132-156; Smith and Brickhouse, 1989, 39-41; 88-105; Reeve, 1989, 33-62; Stokes, 1997 (cf. id., 1992); Taylor, C.C.W. 1998; Nehamas, 1998, 72-86.

7） Part of the *Phaedrus* (*Orat*. 41), the *Apology* (*T.D*. 1.97-99), *Phaedrus* (*T.D*. 1.23); *Gorgias* (*T.D*. 5.34-35); cf.Quint. *Inst*. 10.5; *Cic. Luc*. 2.74.

8） Cic. *Rep*. 1.16; *T.D*. 1.38-39.

9） For reading assumptions, see, for example, *Ac*. 1.16; *de Or*. 3.129

10） Haury, 1955; Takebe, 1983 (b); this improper indifference to Cicero ṡ dialogue form is seen in most of the historical observations of irony, *e.g*. in Nehamas, 1998, 54ff. and partly in Opsomer, 1998,13-14.

11） Glucker, 1997, 58-88; for a general remark on Cicero ṡ understanding of Socrates ' irony, see Tarrant, 2000, 25-26.

12） See Glucker, 1997, n. 9 at p. 62. I heard part of his discussion on Socrates ' irony at his seminar held when I studied in Durham, UK in 1992-1994 but I cannot remember exactly now.

13） See *Bibliotheca Teubneriana Latina*, 1999.

14） Büchner, 1941, n. 1 at p. 340.

15） Haury, 1955; 7-8.

16） Slings text, 2003.

17) Aristophanes *Nub*. 449; *Vesp*. 174; *Av.* 1211; Plato *Ap*. 38a1; *Crat.* 384a1; *Soph.* 268a7; 268b3; 268c8; *Symp.* 216e4; 218d6;. *Euthd.* 302b3.; *Gorg.* 489e1.; 489e3.; *Rp* 337a4;. 337a6;. *Leg.* 908e2 ; (*Amat.* 133d8); Aristoteles *EE* 1221a6; 1221a25; 1233b39; 1234a1; *EN* 1108a22; 1108a22; 1124b30; 1127a14, a22; b22; b30; b31; *HA* 491b17; *MM* 1193a28; 1193a31; *Phgn* 808a.27-29; *Pol.* 1275b27; *Rhet.* 1379b30; b31; 1382b21; 1408b20; 1419b8; 1420a2; *Divisiones Aristoteleae* (Mutschmann, 1906) 58.16; 58.20; 59.1; Theophrastus *Char.* 1.1; Demosthenes *Phil.* 1 7.5; *Phil.* 1 37.5; *Epit.* 18.7; *Ex.* 14.3.2; Anaximenes of Lampsacus, *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*, 1434a17; 1441b24; For the historical observation on εἰρωνεία and irony, see Ribbeck, 1876; Sedgewick, 1948 (orig. 1935); Büchner, 1941; Knox, 1961; Muecke, 1970; Bergson, 1971; Guthrie, 1971, 125-129; Boder, 1973; Takebe, 1982, 1983 (a), 1983 (b), 1984; Nehamas, 1998, 46-69; Opsomer, 1998; for the German Romantic understanding of irony, see Kierkegaard, 1989 (orig. 1841), 219-329.

18） Büchner (1941) chooses Aristotle ṡ passage on εἴρων in *Ethica Nicomachea* to abstract the core sense of εἴρων but Bergson (1971, 410) chooses Aristophanes ' and Plato ṡ.

19） Ar. *Pol*. 1275b26.

20） Ar. *Rhet*. 1382b10; see also Cope ṡ and Sandys ' note (Cope and Sandys, 1877); Ar. *Rhet*. 1419b8 and Cope ṡ and Sandys ' note. For Aristotle ṡ controversial preference of εἴρων over ἀλαζών in *EN*, see Gooch, 1987.

21） See n. 17.

22） Besides Ariston of Keos, mentioned below, Stobaeus later extracted Chrysippus ’criticism of the character of εἰρωνεία (Stobaeus, ecl. II 108, 5 W; Arnim, 1903, III 161), whereas Haury adds two pieces of evidence for rhetoricians ’use of εἰρωνεία as raillery by praise and antiphrasis (Dionysius Thrax (Hilgard, 1901, 14 l.5); Tryphon of Alexandria, Περὶ τρόπων ιθ ’Sp. III 205 (quoted by Haury , 1955, 4-5)).

23） Knox, 1961, 5 (“ It was in Cicero that irony first attained to a complete and positive dignity; he was flattered to be thought an ironist worthy of Socrates ’company. ”) ; Meucke, 1970, 15 (“ For Cicero, ‘ ironia ’ does not have the abusive meanings of the Greek word. ”); Sedgewick, 1948, 12 (“ As far as I know, the chorus of unreserved praise for Socratic irony was led off by Cicero.“ Urbane pretence ”is his word for it; and he says further,“ I think that Socrates in this irony and pretence of his far surpassed everyone else in the way of human grace ””; Sedgewick here, quoting Caesar ’speech in *de Orat*. 269, also takes it that Caesar expresses Cicero ṡ opinion.); Takebe, 1983 (b), 154; a similar over-simplification is seen in Vlastos, 1991, 28; Nehamas, 1998, 51.

24） Haury, 1955, 16; Büchner, 1941, 356; see Cicero, *Off*. 3.61; Quint. *Inst*. 9.2.45.

25） see Cic. *De Orat*. 2.236 ff.; Quint. Inst. 6.3.22-112

26） For Socrates ’conversation in which his interlocutors are faced with the unintended conclusion from their commitments to the propositions embodied in his questions, see Cicero ṡ earlier evidence, *Inv.* 52-54, although neither Socrates ’concealment of his opinion in his question nor his technique in questioning is related to εἰρωνεία.

27） No evidence for this period is reported in Giannantoni, 1990, I 152-169.

28） fr. 14 VII , Wehrli, 1952, 39; Ribbeck, 1876, 395-396; Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, 1920, I 572 n. 1.

29） For the date of composition below, see How, 1926: I, xii-xvi

30） Rackham, 1942; see also Hendrickson, 1962, 9.

31） *T.D*. 2.8-9; How, 1926, II 232-233

32） For Cicero ṡ direct knowledge of Aristotle ṡ *Rhetoric*, see *Orat*. 114; cf. *de Orat*. 2.160. By interpreting Plato ṡ intention of indirectly presenting Thrasymachus as a rhetorician in Plato *Rp*. I 337a3-7, Glucker takes it that Caesar ṡ illustration of εἰρωνεία by Socrates could also be traced to the tradition of rhetoric (1997, 69-71), but there is no direct reference to Socrates as εἴρων in Aristotle ṡ *Rhetoric* or *Rhetoric* by Anaximenes of Lamsachus; nor is there any reference to Thrasymachus as rhetorician in Plato ṡ *Republic*. Reading the rhetorical technique of εἰρωνεία into a

text in the early 4th century BCE might be anachronistic, although the form Thrasymachus used there is substantivised. Anyway, If rhetoricians had already taken Socrates based on what Glucker interprets to be Thrasymachus the rhetoricians ' implication by εἰρωνεία, Caesar in *de Oratore* would with Thrasymachus have associated Socrates with his shrewd inducement to dialectic.

33) Haury, 1955, 7, 11; *Att*. 16.11.2: How, Letter 90; Shackleton Bailey, Letter 420; *Fam*. 4.4.1: Shackleton Bailey, Letter 203; *Ad Q*. 3.4.4: Shackleton Bailey, Letter 24.

34) For *subtilitas*, see *OLD*; cf. *De Orat*. 3.60.

35) Glucker, 1997, 71.

36) Glucker skates over this qualification of Atticus ' (1997, 67; 71).

37) *Ap*. 22d4-e1; 29b1-2.

38) *Gorg*. 457e1-b3.

39) Rackham, 1951.

40) Haury, 1955, 14.

41) Dörrie, 1987, 154-157;

42) Schäublin, 1995.

43) Broemser, 1997.

44) Sedley, 2002, n. 25.

45) See also their commentary at p. 414; cf. Sedley, ibid.

46) For this uncommunicability in Hellenistic philosophy, see Long, 1988.

47) *Ap*. 19c2-6.

48) Glucker, 1997, 73 ff.

49) See note 4.

50) Glucker, 1997, 81.

51) *T.D*. 5.10; Ac. 1.46; cf. Ac. 1.15; *de Orat*. 1.39

52) Miller, (Loeb), 1913.

53) Reference here is made to the previous section.

54) *de Orat*. 2.161, 3.80; *Rep*. 3.8-9; Fat. 23-24; 31ff.; *Leg*. 1.39; *Fin*. 2.59; 4.50; 5.20; *Luc*. 2.28; 2.67-68; 2.78; 2.112; Ac. 1.35; *T.D*. 3.54; 3.59; 4.53; 5.83; *N.D*. 1.70; 2.2; 2.161; 3.29; 3.44.

55) For Carneades ' eloquence, see *de Orat*. 1.45, 3.36 in Crassus ' speech; 2.161 in Antonius ' speech; *Orat*. 51; *Fin*. 3.41 in Cato s speech; *Luc*. 2.60 in Lucullus ' speech; *Ac*. 1.46; for his analysis of arguments, see Fin. 5.16 in Cicero s speech; 3.41 in Cato s speech; *T.D*. 5.120.

56) *de Orat*. 3.80; *Leg*. 1.39; *Luc*. 2.67-68; *Ac*. 1.46; *N.D*. 5.11.

57) *de Orat*. 1.49; 3.71 in Crassus ' speech; cf. 3.147 in Sulpicius ' speech.

58) *Luc*. 2.30-62; 2.67-68; 2.78 in Lucullus ' speech; 2.104-111; 2.112 in Cicero s speech; *N.D.* 1.12; *Off*. 3.20; cf. Augustinus, *Contra Academicos*, 2.26.

59) I learned this point both from criticisms against Vlastos ' idea of Socrates ' irony: Kahn, 1992; Gottlieb, 1992; Gordon, 1996; Nehamas, 1998, 19-98; Vasiliou, 1999, 2002; Boder, 1973; Stokes, 1986: 183-184; 203-204. Narcy also suggests that set apart what Socrates ' opponents regard as his evasion (εἰρωνεία), Socrates in Plato ś dialogues is sometimes not ironical but rather appears ambivalently serious and jesting and that this ambivalent appearance is open to readers ' interpretation (2000, 282-291). I am not as sure as Nehamas (ibid.) whether the speaker is judged to be intending to talk irony if he or she does not intend to give any audience, direct or indirect, any clue to what he or she is trying to conceal in his or her speech. In that case I should say that only signs of irony are detected by some particular acute audience, leaving open to question whether the intending of talking irony is true. In so far as utterance is not inaction but contact with others, silence or self-concealment by utterance is impossible. How could one who says something in a committal form of speech refrain from any commitment without deception?

60) For the arbitrariness lurking in the interpretive tool of reading irony into Plato ś Socrates, see Smith and Brickhouse, 2000, 58-68; Sedley, 2002 (cf. id. 2001).

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