Hutcheson, Church and Stoicism: Politeness as Moral Education for a Commercial Polity

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After the union with England in 1707 which deprived Scotland of its political independence Scots tried to find a new patriotic expression in the improvement of learning, commerce and moral virtue. Edinburgh was now aptly called the Athens of the North: the citizens there would emulate the English not in the pursuit of political and military power but in polite culture. The patriotic leaders of Scottish society were intellectuals in such cultural institutions as universities, churches and clubs. They were committed to the cause of politeness which consisted in refined sensibility and manners through free conversation. The ideal of moderation and self-restraint which politeness entailed was derived from the Stoic tradition in Ciceronian humanism; they found in the tradition an explanation of virtue improved through culture.[1] In their view human nature has sociability which encourages men and women to improve their moral self-discipline through the social intercourse and spectatorial approval and disapproval of each other's behaviour. Moreover the tradition had an concept of the universal order of justice by which it could be connected with natural jurisprudence taught in Scottish universities as an essential subject for individuals in a commercial polity. Stoic virtue and natural sociability were naturally opposed to Augstinianism of the orthodox dogmas of the Presbyterian Church of Scotland.

Francis Hutcheson was a leading professor of moral philosophy in the 1730s and 40s. I want to examine his moral philosophy as moral education for the practical purposes of Scottish society which I have observed briefly above. Sher's standard study of Scottish church and university makes clear how Hutcheson's moral ideas of Christian Stoicism shaped the outlook of the next generation of moderate literati, such as Robertson, Ferguson and so on.[2] This essay will discuss two main points about Hutcheson's moral teaching in his Glasgow period. First, I will put his synthesis of Christian religion and Stoic morals in a historical context of three social forces: the state, the church and polite culture. The church seems to have been faced with, and obliged to comply with, the challenges of the state and polite culture. I will try to re-create Hutcheson's context by describing the contemporary issue of church patronage and several Scottish thinkers for and against Hutcheson's teaching of virtue. Second, I will read his moral psychology as his attempt to reconstitute the Stoic tradition of self-control for a modern commercial society. His explanation of human moral perception and virtue was underpinned by his analysis of the passions of men in social relations. So I will see how Stoic independence was achieved through sociable sensibility in his account. In his plan of Stoic education the concept of politeness included not only external observance of duties and laws but also virtues of internal benevolent affections.

The revolution of 1688-89 abolished the episcopacy and reestablished the Presbyterian government in the Church of Scotland, and the union of 1707 guaranteed the independence of this national system, but this church established by law was never secure or stable. The relation of

the British state and this church and that of an emergent civil society and the church still remained to be settled. The patronage debates during the 1730s and 40s show this instability of the church. In 1690, with church patronage of the crown and nobility abolished, elders and heritors had the right to elect a minister in a country parish. Though this arrangement was secured by the act for securing the Protestant religion and Presbyterian church-government passed with the Union Treaty, the Tories back in power revived patronage to annoy Whigs and Presbyterians in 1712. As liberty of Presbyterian church was a sensitive issue for Scottish national sentiment, the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland protested against the patronage acts as destroying 'the ancient Constitution of Scotland'.[3] Patrons did not exercise their patronage for a while, but in the late 1720s they began to enforce it systematically. Thus the patronage problem was debated as a vital issue related to the church polity.[4] Sher and Murdoch classify criticisms of patronage into three types.[5] The most radical and democratic type originating in Knox's *The First Book of Discipline* decided that all the men in a congragation should have votes to elect a minister. The second type originating in Melville's *The Second Book of Discipline* and realized in the 1640 act gave votes to presbyteries and kirk sessions. The third type argued that local landed gentlemen as heritors should lead a minister's election and this alternative had a precedent in the 1690 act and was an application of Revolution Whig ideology against court patronage and influence.

While the first and second positions were held by seceders and some local reculcitrant presbyteries, leading moderate churchmen took the third and the General Assembly's act of 1732 was of this type. So

the leaders of the church were opposed to the crown patronage, and at the same time they were advocating lay leadership of country gentlemen against clericalism of the first and second Presbyterian tradition. It seems that the patronage dabate was concerned not so much about the independence of the Scottish church as about government within the church. The 1730s saw the publication of quite a few pamphlets, whose arguments were mainly based on the Bible and ecclesiastical history. Some pamphleteers justified the patronage act by arguing the supremacy of the legislature over the church: 'our church-constitution is confirmed by civil laws.'[6] Some rejected the popular votes in favour of lay heritors' leadership because the nomination of ministers was not 'spiritual matters' but 'temporal concerns'[7]. Others rejected 'Levelling Doctrine' to keep the church control and order; 'the private Judgment of Discretion, which the people have, is to be guided by the publick Judgment of the Church-Representative'[8]. These views were all modern and secular in that they pitted the state, polite society or the moderate leadership against fundamentalist tendency to make each private spirit absolute by the divine inspiration.

On the other hand the secular state and the General Assembly seemed to critics of the first and second types to be inimical to the independent rights of the church and the people respectively. One pamphleteer called defenders of patronage 'our modern Presbyterian Disputants, our Erastian Presbyterians'; patronage was the state's encroachment of the church's right of election of its ministers.[9] One of the most conspicuous opponents of patronage and church leaders was Ebenezer Erskine (1680-1754), who followed the Covenanters' radical

tradition and denounced the General Assembly's policy of compromise in 1732, seceding from the church. He belonged to the first type of critics of patronage; in his view a heritor was a 'man with the gold ring and the gay clothing' and the authority of the General Assembly dominated by a prevailing party could not be superior to the consent of the congregation.[10] He supported the British state and legislature, and his opposition was directed to a party of the church which put a merely human authority above the divine authority and private judgement.[11] While in Presbyterian polity the people should be represented through kirk-sessions, presbyteries, synods and the General Assembly, the Assembly acted against the popular mind[12]; this was tyranny for him. We find in him the national tradition of the previous century still surviving as he urged 'the Obligations these Lands are under to promote Reformation, by our Covenants National and Solemn League'[13]. The moderate and liberal trend among the intellectuals in the Scottish church and university was anathema to him; 'a refined System of natural Religion' was depravity from the Westminster Confession and he demanded prosecution of John Simson (1668-1740), Archibald Campbell (ob. 1756), Robert Wallace (1696-1771)[14]. Erskine's concepts of popular consent and private judgement were subject to the absolute divine authority, so I should say that they need to be transformed into independent principles, with human faculty of moral perception examined, before they can be a creative principle of democracy.

It was not the divine prescription but the human utility that guided Hutcheson in choosing church government, so any particular form should not be enforced but toleration was the consequence of his

guiding principle. He remarked: 'I do not imagine that either [church] government or externals of worship are so determined in the Gospel as to oblige men to one particular way in either; [so] that all societies may, according to their own prudence choose... as they think will do most good, to promote the true need of all real piety and virtue, but without any right of forcing others into it....'[15] He seems to have brought a new factor, that is, a provincial society with polite culture, into the patronage debate where people had discussed in terms of relations of church and state. While his critique of patronage, as Sher and Murdoch interpret, was the third type in the above classification as he expected 'Gentlemen in the Country' to oppose 'Court Interest', he was also critical of popular and zealous ministers 'of little Learning, Sense, or Moderation'[16], encouraging polite gentlemen to instill polite culture into the church. I may suggest his expectation that politeness of provincial gentlemen would produce public opinion critical both of the state authority and of fanaticism of bigoted highflyers in the church.

The language of politeness was originally associated with the royal court and in fact I notice a pamphleteer for court patronage making use of the language of politeness. His view was similar to Moderatism in the late eighteenth century; he argued that the court was exercizing patronage prudently consulting 'the heritors, gentlemen, who for the most part had university education, or are taught the rules of politeness, and by their frequent conversation with men of learning know a great more, so must be allowed to be able to make a better choice, than country clowns.'[17] Besides remarking the church's dependence on the civil power, he represented the critics of patronage

as opponents of polite religion. His concern was that unnecessary discord due to the patronage issue was encouraging atheism and deism whereas Christianity alone could produce the foundation for sociability and civic education. He referred to 'A Polite Author, writing in Defence of Christianity', saying, 'The temper of a religion is,... an argument for or against it'.[18] Prevalent forms of Christian Stoicism represented Christianity as a comprehensive true religion which assured the natural order for social morality. Politeness and patronage could combine against Presbyterian sectarian enthusiasm. Hutcheson seemingly intended to create polite culture independent of the court so that he might criticize both patronage and intolerant bigotry. His critique of patronage is interpreted as proclaiming Scottish nationalism against the Metropolis and as an application of Commonwealthmen ideology[19]. I admit that it had these aspects, but here I want to notice his advocacy of polite culture which would replace patronage as a control over the church. In the previous century of religious wars people struggled to settle the relation of church and state, but it seems that, discussing religious and political issues in the eighteenth century, people had to consider a third factor, polite culture which formed a new public sphere; society was expected to produce and improve public opinion and civic virtue through social discipline in which people were approving and disapproving each other's sentiments and behaviours.

Scottish moral philosophers adopted Christian Stoicism to reform education in university and church. I will examine how they tried to reconcile virtue with religion. Their ideal of politeness included refinement of sentiments and manners, toleration, a free inquiry and

conversation. These did not necessarily deny the deity's existence or providence, yet they required considerable modification of Augustinian outlook of human nature. In the orthodox doctrine of Presbyterianism virtue suitable for corrupt human nature was humility and private conscience was under God's immediate discipline. So for orthodox people Stoic self-discipline would seem a vice of pride and social discipline by spectatorial relations would seem dependence. The Westminster Confession regarded human nature as helpless without grace because of 'original corruption, whereby we are utterly indisposed, disabled, and made opposite to all good, and wholly inclined to all evil.'[20] Catechism contained moral law only 'to convince them [all men] their disability to keep it.'[21] In its extreem form Presbyterian liberty of private conscience could degenerate into intolerance, and spiritual and moral values were supposed to be realized exclusively in the city of God.

Secular moral philosophy might be considered as a pursuit of self-control in society through polite culture. Into early eighteenth-century Scotland came English Augustan culture represented by Shaftesbury's philosophy and Addison and Steel's journalism so that many Scots took interest in polite tastes and manners as an important means of national moral improvemnet.[22] Reconstruction of moral philsosphy for politeness was under way in main universities even before Hutcheson's inauguration in Glasgow in 1730. Though often assumed to be the father of the Scottish Enlightenment, he was rather among Scottish moralists in the contexts of English influence on them and Irish Presbyterians' and republicans' exchange of ideas with them. George Turnbull lectured on moral philosophy as science of man in

Marischal College, Aberdeen as early as in 1721-27.[23] He thought that 'religion and virtue are one and the same thing,' and replaced enthusiasm with sociability: 'when one abandones the world to give himself up to religious contemplation, mankind being naturally made for social exercise and communication with one another in many acts of benevolence and friendship, the right balance of the mind will be lost:'[24] Stoic tranquility which enthusiasm destroyed would be regained by social affections.

Hutcheson dedicated his moral philosophy to education of his students and citizens in Glasgow so that they would refine their moral sentiments. He revealed his intention: 'I hope I am contributing to promote the more moderate and charitable sentiments in religious matters in this country, where there yet remains too much warmth and animosity about matters of no great consequence to real religion. We must make allowance for the power of education and have indulgence to the weakness of our brethren.'[25] In his inauguration address he criticized both Epicurian self-love theory of Hobbes and Pufendorf's theory of sociability derived from rational calculation of self-interest, and expounded Stoic natural sociability of man whose essence was benevolence. Thereby he tried to change the moral foundation for Pufendorf's account of duties, *On the Duty of Man and Citizen,* which was adopted as a text of moral philosophy in Scottish universities. Though virtuous human nature was not consistent with fallen state in the church orthodoxy, Hutcheson, while admitting the present depravity of man, turned to 'the original structure of our nature' before sin; he found there 'that moral sense that we also call natural conscience' and identified it with the Stoic ruling principle. In this way he tried to avoid

antagonism with 'Protestant theologians'[26]. So in his Christian Stoicism self-control was a recovery of the original structure of human nature instituted by the deity.

Hutcheson's eloquent lecture on virtue fascinated many students as is shown by their often quoted appreciative remarks. But his ethics and natural theology were not congenial to devout presbyteries strong in the western regions of Scotland, and he was prosecuted, though unsuccessfully, by Glasgow Presbytery for violating the Westminster Confession in 1737. The next year saw a pamphlet by an alleged ex-student who had been almost captivated by Hutheson's account of virtue and the moral sense but realized his deviation from Christianity. His apprehension of Hutcheson's influence through his disciples now in the important positions of the church may be an evidence of his wide popularity. Hutcheson was denounced as a Shaftesburian deist in eleven points: for instance, the possibility of understanding the good and bad without the knowledge of God; the moral standard not in God's law but in the tendency to promote others' happiness; subjection of the church to 'the temporal good of the State'; 'an absolute unlimited Toleration of all Manners of Doctrines that are not directly inconsistent with the publick Tranquility'.[27] Some disciples of Hutcheson replied to this pamphlet, arguing that an enemy of Christianity was rather 'a Spirit of Persecution' and that he was not a deist but put religion on the firm foundation of morality.[28]

Hutcheson was denounced by the Presbytery partly because he taught ordianry citizens Christianity in Sunday school outside the church institution. This teaching shows his intention to make Christianity open to laymen's discussion. His text was Grotius's *The Truth of the*

Christian Religion. Grotius wanted to recover peace and unity among Christians by this apologetics without dogmas. For this purpose he chose to explain a few unifying common truths of Christianity to persuade outsiders as he stated, 'I contrive to motivate atheists, heathens, Jews and Moslems to acknowledge that Christianity is the true religion.'[29] This tolerant religion of humanist tradition was just what Hutcheson tried to revive. This type of Christianity is reconcilable with ancient moral philosophy: 'There is the less Reason for the Heathens to oppose the Christian Religion, because all the parts of it are so agreeable to the Rules of Virtue.'[30] Furthermore some improvement of ancient morality may be found in this religion; presumably modern private liberty will be better secured in Christian humanity than in Pagan military and political virtues and 'those Vices, which under a Shew of Virtue deceived many of the Greeks and Romans, viz, the Desire of Honour and Glory'.[31] Another advantage of Christinaity may be the concept of the furute reward as the end of man or the greatest good for him. This would supersede the opposition between Stoic virtue as happiness and Epicurean sensual pleasure. The future happiness reconciles virtue and sensibility and helps us to get a tranquil mind.[32]

Hutcheson's commitment to Christian Stoicism as moral education is shown by Marcus Aurelius's *Meditations* translated by him and James Moor. They insisted on finding true piety and virtue in this heathen philosopher and contrasted his small persecution of Christians with greater sectarian persecution among Christians in their introduction and read 'providence' into 'nature' in many translated passages.[33] In Stoicism universal harmony is supposed to be reflected in human

nature and Hutcheson seems to have been interested in how to preserve that harmony by self-control. Marcus Aurelius's advice is to 'CULTIVATE with all care that power which forms opinions: all depends on this'.[34] Control of opinions leads to restraint of fancy and Hutcheson remarked in a note: 'This examination of the images of fancy, so often mentioned by Antonius, is one of the most excellent means for preserving puriety of mind.'[35] Distinguishing between some apparent good and the real value requires the notion of the supreme good, which we will see later in Hutcheson's textbook of moral philosophy.

Many Scottish moral philosophers pursued virtue by way of Christian Stoicism which they expected to reform education supervised by the church without clashing with it. But Hutchesone's advocacy of polite culture did not always enjoy favourable responses from his contemporary Scots. Some thinkers maintained traditional Christian morals on the basis of self-love, denying natural sociability and virtue. Alexander Forbes referred mainly to French Augustinian moralists and expounded ethics of two kinds of enlightened self-love: either self-love can be enlightened by necessity of reciprocity of offices for satisfying our needs to lead us to socially beneficial actions; or self-love can be turned to love of God which the divine grace helps to achieve virtue as he mentioned 'the Capacity of being transformed into a new Nature by the Power of God, or what is call'd Grace'.[36] He outlined the history of arguments about virtue from Stoics vs. Epicurians to Shaftesbury vs. La Rochefoucauld and Bayle and remarked that Shaftesbury's 'calm benevolence' and 'self-approbation' were the same as 'the cool deliberate selfishness'. His Christian outlook of man was opposed to Hutcheson's;

'Stoical old-fashion'd Pride has been of late dress'd up into a kind of System, by which the defective Nature of Man... and the whole visible Creation, are represented as quite free of Imperfection and Evil... such a strange Representation of the Excelency of human Nature, as to reject all Necessity of a Mediator, Revelation, and the continual Influence of the Divine Spirit on the impure fallible Spirits of Men,...'[37] Thus criticizing what he called 'a modern Heathenism', remarkably he recommended 'deceny' as an alternative to morality based on virtue and law based on self-interest. Decency is observed because of our sentiments of shame and remorse and he found sociality of selfishness: we have 'a Desire of the Approbation of others' which derives from our persuasion of the dignity of human being.[38] In fact we need to know and approve ourselves to exist, but we can not do so without spectatorial others, in whose place we put ourselves in imagination for self-approval, so others are essential for our self. He seems to have grasped this and opposed it to the Stoic concept of independence as he said that 'we must often have the Approbation of others, in order to reconcile us to ourselves... pure independent Self-sufficiency is not a natural state of Mind'.[39] Forbes may show a Scottish climate of opinion in which modern detail analyses of human psychology were deconstructing the Stoic ideal of self-control, and politeness tended to be considered in terms of decency without virtue. Hutcheson may have perceived a moral crisis in this climate and replied to it.

Archibald Campbell, a disciple of Simson and professor of ecclesiastical history in the University of St. Andrews, tried to explain Hutchesonian virtue in terms of self-love. His concept of self-love has nothing inconsistent with benevolence because, as he argued, self-love

is expressed as the desire of esteem, which prompts us to mutual benevolence and offices.[40] If self-love is to be a principle of virtue, self-love must be put in social relations and self must be self reflected in others' view. For him Hutcheson's idea of self-love was too confined and Mandeville's idea of virtue was too rigid; if taken in the right meaning, self-love should be the foundation of virtue. While presupposing self-love, Campbell rejected Hobbes's state of nature, combining self-love with sociability; 'a mutual Intercourse of kind Affections and Actions' causes natural society before the establishment of political society.[41] He was an eclectic, referring to an enormous number of ancient philosophers, whom he thought of as instructive to prospective ministers. His appreciation of the ancient moral philosophy in the education of ministers is shown by his statement: 'I pretend to account for Moral Virtue from heathen Philosophers... next to the holy Scripture, moral Philosophy ought to be the main Study of a Christian Divine.'[42] He regarded the church mainly as an institution of moral education as he said, 'Is it not owing to the Gospel of Jesus Christ that everywhere throughout the Christian world, in towns and villages, and all over the country, churches, or as one may justly call them, public schools, are erected wherein public teachers are employed to train up mankind without distinction in the knowledge of their duty and to persuade them to the life and practice of all righteousness?'[43] But, unlike Hutcheson, he interpreted the account of duties of Cicero, Seneca, Antonius and others as self-love theory. In fact he mentioned Cicero as making self-interest the moral standard when he criticized Hutcheson: 'very selfish is Tully, that he expressly directs us to express our Love, and regulates our Beneficence towards others by this very

Standard.'[44]

Hutcheson found a comrade in education reform in William Wishart, a principal of the College of Edinburgh, who was influenced by Shaftesbury, Molesworth, Butler as well as Hutcheson. He was convinced that 'there is such a disposition of Benevolence or a social affection in Human Nature, independent of all deliberate views of self-interest'[45] and that Christianity was a religion promoting this benevolence. He was a moral realist, criticizing Sceptics and Epicurians: there is a distinction between moral good and evil prior to law, and man has a faculty for perceiving it. This was called 'Sense of Beauty and Deformity in Life and Manners' or 'Conscience'.[46] Later, in reply to orthodox Augustinians, he distinguished 'the natural Sense of Goodness' and 'a natural Inclination to Goodness',[47] and thereby tried to reconcile the faculty of moral perception with corrupt human nature. As the faculty enables man to keep a due balance among the passions and obtain happiness, it is a foundation of Stoic self-control. Moreover we can say that this moral faculty underpins freedom of conscience. He was a keen advocate of freedom of private judgement as 'the natural and unalienable Rights'. This freedom was based on the Lockean distinction between the sphere of political power and the religious sphere of private judgement: 'a free choice is the very soul of it [religion]' and civil magistrates should not interfere by punishment to enforce church authority.[48] Before public opinion came to be justified as autonomous and critical of the public authority of church and state, probably it was necessary that each private opinion should be examined and selected by the moral faculty. Wishart was persuaded that 'Opinion is all in all', referring to Shaftesbury's quotation of Marcus Aurelius.[49]

So Stoic self-control was related to freedom of speech. The practical application of his moral philosophy was education reform, and in his view corruption among the youth was not due to corruption in human nature, but to the neglect of 'a rational and virtuous Education': university education was teaching 'shibboleth of a Party' so that social affections were checked while selfish passions encouraged.[50] This moral critique of the church superintending education caused a reaction from orthodox churchmen. In one pamphlet Wishart's 'polite Way of Preaching' was regarded as non-Christian education relying on Shaftesbury rather than the Bible and 'the good old Way' of the Confession of Faith and Catechism was recommended against 'this refined and polite Age'.[51] Christian Stoicism may have looked like a chimera in the orthodox eyes and the two components were severed and contrasted. While the church authority was defensive, admitting the trend towards the Enlightenment, it tried to preserve the Scottish Presbyterian tradition as a distinctive field from permeating secular culture of politeness. The critique of Hutcheson and Wishart in the 1730s seemingly prefigured in a number of ways a later development of the Popular and Evangelical critiques of the Moderates, of which the most famous was John Witherspoon's *Ecclesiastical Characteristics* (1753)

While providing the public with a model of noble sentiments by translating Marcus Aurelius, Hutcheson wrote a university textbook, *Philosophiae Moralis Institutio Compendiara* (1745), which was a summary of his moral philosophy of Stoic reconstruction for moral education. It may be said that he tried to explain the Stoic practical

morality and education by having recourse to modern epistemology and analysis of passions and to make Stoic self-discipline compatible with the pursuit of happiness by adding Christian outlook of providence. Stoic ethics has, as he noticed, a distinction between duty and virtue: the former concerns the external actions for the pursuit of interests and is related to natural law; and the latter concerns the culture of benevolent affections and the supreme good. The former is morally indifferent and the latter is essential for a perfect system of ethics. But his contemporary moral philosophy tended to regard only the former as Cicero's and Pufendorf's influential books on duties.[52] So, while Hutcheson's system of moral philosophy was mainly constructed on the Pufendorfian model of natural laws and rights which surely gave him a more democratic tendency than Shaftesbury, the fundamental part by which he wanted to improve moral philosophy seems to have been ethics covering virtues and the supreme good. While he referred his students to Grotius, Pufendorf, Cumberland, Barbeyrac, Locke, Harrington, Shaftesbury and Carmichael in further reading, he suggested that they should 'Go to the grand fountains of all the sciences, of all elegance; the inventers and improvers of all ingenious arts, the Greek and Roman writers: and ... have recourse also to yet purer fountains, the holy Scriptures'.[53] This may suggest that Stoic and Christian languages should be picked up from among languages forming his moral philosophy, such as natural jurisprudence and civic humanism.

In his early works Hutcheson formulated the human faculty of moral perception. Using Lockean epistemology he traced moral approval to the perception of an idea of virtue by the moral sense,

which could not be reduced to the rational deliberation of self-interest. Finding the moral faculty in the sense is naturally contrary to Stoicism, according to which all the senses should be controlled by the ruling principle of reason. But partial particularity of passions compelled him to adopt reason in his account of 'general calm desires'.[54] It is an accepted interpretation that he tended to identify the moral sense as reason or conscience partly because he was influenced by Christian Stoicism of Butler, who observed that Shaftesbury's view of virtue was defective in failing to consider conscience or reflection.[55] Thus his theory of the moral sense was incorporated into the Stoic self-control. He remarked that 'to regulate the highest powers of our nature, our affections and deliberate designs of action in important affairs, there's implanted by nature the noblest and most divine of all our senses, that Conscience by which we discern what is graceful, becoming, beautiful and honourable in the affections of the soul, in our conduct of life, our words and actions.'[56] This shows that his theory of virtue presupposed *a priori* belief of the moral aim of the humanity constituted by the divinity. His persistence in this Christian Stoic assumption was probably a reaction to Hume's theoretically superior scepticism in his *Treatise of Human Nature* which they discussed in their correspondence.[57]

It seems that Hutcheson, on the one hand, opened a new perspective by introducing modern epistemology and social psychology into Stoic ethics and, on the other hand, defended the central belief of Christian Stoicism from Hume's devastating scepticism. Hutcheson's significant contribution might be his considering morality in terms of our perception and approval of virtue. As people with this faculty naturally try to understand with approval or disapproval each other's

affections, the study of moral perception leads to the study of social relations. Then morality is seen to be formed among people mutually approving and disapproving, not necessarily dictated by God to man. Since Stoic independence will hardly be practical in modern society in which people are interdependent with necessary commerce of sentiments, offices and goods, independence must be reconceptualized to be consistent with modern sociability. This is just what Shaftesbury intended to achieve with his new concept of politeness.[58] It might be said that Hutcheson also tried to change Stoicism into ethics of modern society by working out self-discipline through sociable sensibility. Self-approval and self-disapproval require detachment from self and putting self in a spectator's place. Each in reality achieves this ability to judge oneself after each judges and communicates with the other until some standard of approval is shared. Thus rises 'intersubjectivity of moral judgement'.[59] Without sociability the moral sense may remain subjective. Prejudice, custom, education and fanaticism sometimes corrupt the moral sense, yet it will be cured of such partiality if put in extensive spectatorial relations.

So sociability proves to be a way to moral improvement, and Hutcheson is critical of Stoic indiference, saying that 'That must be a very fantastick Scheme of Virtue, which represents it as a private sublimely selfish Discipline, to preserve our selves wholly unconcerned, not only in the Changes of Fortune as to our Wealth or Poverty, Liberty or Slavery, Ease or Pain, but even in all external Events whatsoever, in the Fortunes of our dearest Friends or Country, solacing our selves that we are easy and undisturbed.'[60] His critique of Stoicism as remodelling the divine constitution of human nature may have been

influenced by Malebranche's appreciation of sociable passions. Malebranche's 'science of man' consisted in experimental analysis of the passions and he showed an almost Humean understanding of the extensive power of the passions and rejected Stoic pride because 'it is rediculous to philosophize against experience.'[61] Hutcheson developed Malebranche's analysis of the passions and distinguished and balanced private and public passions, instead of denying them all. Generous affections and sympathy prove sociability of human nature and natural disposition to moderation and self-control. Besides the moral sense/conscience and benevolence, he found the sense of honour and shame to restrain selfishness effectively in social relations. An independent and indifferent person would not mind at all his honour and shame, so he may suffer enthusiasm. The idea of moral discipline became so extensive as to include sociability as a means of it. Politeness might be understood as a modification of Stoic self-discipline with the recognition of a sociable constitution of human self; the reciprocity of spectatorial moral approval/disapproval through free conversation helps us to improve our moral potential to attain the perfect virtue of impartial benevolence. Moral significance of sociability was remarked also by Butler, who stated that 'to have no restraint from, no regard to, others in our behaviour is the speculative absurdity of considering ourselves as single and independent, as having nothing in our nature which has respect to our fellow creature, reduced to action and practice.'[62]

In Hutcheson's synthesis of the Stoic language and the modern language of sensibility self-control was put in the social relations of free communication among equal citizens, yet it still required not only 'frequent impartial meditation' on human nature[63] but the Christian

Stoic hierarchical order of values for the restraint of fanciful opinions. Hutcheson searched for the supreme good by classifying human pleasures by their dignity and duration. His division is: 1. sensual pleasures, 2. pleasures of beauty, 3. pleasures of sympathy, 4. pleasures of virtue, 5. pleasures of piety. Corrupt opinions are due to the association of ideas which puts an idea of some higher pleasure on some lower one.[64] Priority given to piety and virtue proves him to have been a Christian Stoic moralist with belief in the divine creation of man for the definite purposes. Providence is an essential security for keeping moderation and self-control when adversity threatens to discourage moral virtue and sociability. Noticing 'the instable condition of terrestrial affairs' and 'the weakness and inconstancy of human virtues', Hutcheson envisaged the future end of history in which the humanity and the states would perish and the eternal happiness would be realized by the divine grace.[65] In the general framework of his moral philosophy society and morality did not supersede religion but the city of God remained the ulfimate goal, so in this respect he remaind Augustinian.

Though situated within this Augustinian limitation, civil society was morally worthwhile on its own in this limitation of mortality in Hutcheson's system. In society opinions were disciplined both by social education of polite culture and by government instruction; he wanted civil magistrates 'to instill into the minds of their subjects the true sentiments of religion and virtue' as well as to preserve their property.[66] This promotion of self-control by government may be compared with neo-Stoicism's connection with absolutism. The main point of Neo-Stoicism was that self-control was useful to reason of

state for providing obedient subjects and securing a peaceful order. As Hutcheson's ideological intention was clearly not the defence of absolutism but that of revolution, the emphasis of his Stoicism was put on self-control through social relations among private persons so that any restraint by government's force would become irrelevant. In fact he referred to Epictetus's epigram: 'Choose rather to correct your own passions, than to be corrected and punished on their account.'[67] We may say, therefore, that self-control and toleration were essential for each other. Polite culture which Hutcheson and other Scots introduced, synthesizing Stoicism of self-discipline and moral psychology of sociable passions, was forming a new moral sphere of society besides church and state.

Notes

1) For the polite culture in the Scottish historical situations, see Nicholas Phillipson, 'The Scottish Enlightenment,' in ed. R. Porter and M. Teich, *The Enlightenment in National Context*, Cambridge UP, 1981, pp. 22-32.; Peter Jones, 'The Scottish Professoriate and the Polite Academy, 1720-46,' ed. I. Hont and M. Ignatieff, *Wealth and Virtue*, Cambridge UP, 1985, p. 90.
2) Richard B. Sher, *Church and University in the Scottish Enlightenment*, Edinburgh UP, 1985, pp. 175-186.
3) The Commission of the General Assembly, the Church of Scotland, *A Collection of Papers against the Scots Toleration and Patronages That Have Been Printed or Presented to Her Majesty, and the Two Houses of Parliament*, London, 1712, p. 53.
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